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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND THE
LANDOWNER CASES
WEx S. MALONE*
WITH THE decision of the now famous dispute between
Messrs. Butterfield and Forrester in 1809,1 the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence was insinuated into the common law. Since
then it has become ingrafted securely into the legal system, and
for more than a century judges have been solemnly repeating over
and over that a plaintiff cannot recover for the negligence of the
defendant if he was guilty of any fault that contributed to his own
injury. The doctrine has persisted in almost universal usage despite
frequently expressed misgivings on the part of legal writers, who'
have called it a "ruthless defense"' or a misapplication of the you-
are-another epithet.
Although different explanations of the doctrine have been ad-
vanced, the currently accepted view is that contributory negligence
is an affirmative defense which gives expression to the individualis-
tic attitude of the common law. Accordingly, the plaintiff must
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1(1809) 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Reprints 926.
"Green, Judge and Jury (1930) 115.
2The doctrine has been explained as a corollary of the idea of proximate
cause. Pollock, The Law of Torts (13 ed. 1929) 759. Compare 1 Street, The
Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) c. 9.
Professor Schofield suggests that the doctrine expresses a policy of
the law to so place responsibility that similar accidents can best be avoided
in tie future. Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negli-
gence (1890) 3 Harv. L. Rev. 263.
The suggestion has been advanced that so long as the plaintiff's fault
must be given some effect no fairer disposition of the situation can be made
than to preclude recovery when the plaintiff is negligent. This is best de-
scribed, perhaps, as a "choice of evils" theory. See Lowndes, Contributory
Negligence (1934) -22 Geo. L. J. 674.
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shoulder primarily the burden of caring for himself, and only when
all reasonable efforts of self help have failed is he permitted to call
upon the courts for assistance.4 Another explanation, which differs
from the above only in shading, is that the plaintiff's personal fault
disqualifies him from maintaining his action under notions akin
to the "clean hands" doctrine of equity.5 The common factor under-
lying these views is that against a negligent plaintiff a personal bar
is interposed which precludes him from recovering irrespective of
the merit his case otherwise may possess. This is the analytical
structure upon which the Restatement of Torts proceeds. It is
supported by the text writers7 and by the statements of courts in
the reported decisions.
Despite the almost universal acceptance which has been accorded
the doctrine under this interpretation, the defense has found little
support in the experience of everyday practice. No lawyer possessed
of even an ordinary degree of trial intuition is likely to reject a
case that otherwise bodes well for recovery merely because he
is satisfied that his client was admittedly careless. The experienced
attorney will anticipate that in such a case some indefinite effect
may be given to the negligence of the plaintiff, that the court and
jury will weigh it as one of the factors affecting recovery. He will
even be prepared to argue vigorously on the contributory negli-
gence issue in the court room, but his capacity to sense the more
subtle factors that influence the passing of judgment prompts him
to proceed in the face of the law in the law books, and his likely
reward will be a favorable verdict which will be sustained by both
the trial and appellate courts. I
Contributory Negligence and the Jury
The observation has often been made that the average jury-
man tends to pay little or no attention to the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff if he feels that recovery is otherwise war-
ranted.8 Although he by no means ignores the plaintiff's conduct as
4This explanation was first advanced by Professor Bohlen: Bohlen,
Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 233.
5Owen, C. J., in Davis v. Guarnieri, (1887) 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N. E.
350. See Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) Sec. 132.6Restatement, Torts (1934) Secs. 281, 467.
7"Unlike assumption of risk, the defense does not rest upon the idea
that the defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff. Rather the
plaintiff is denied recovery because his own conduct disentitles him to main-
tain the action. In the eyes of the law both parties are at fault." Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 393.8james, Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine (1938) 47 Yale
L. 3. 704, 717; Lowndes, supra note 3. See also Gregory, Legislative Loss
Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936) 3.
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a part of the composite fact picture on which he passes judgment,
yet he is unwilling to accept the notion that recovery should be
denied arbitrarily because of the plaintiff's carelessness. The de-
fense simply does not fit in with his sense of fair play, so he refuses
to recognize it or he takes the plaintiff's fault into consideration
merely in determining the amount of recovery.
Jury action of this kind was usual in common law suits for
injuries to laborers prior to the advent of workmen's compensation
acts, and played an impressive part in leading to a revisioi of the
law of industrial accidents. There is no reason to believe that the
instinct of the jury to administer court-made rules so as to meet
its own sense of right and wrong is confined to any one field of
endeavor. Nor can such action by juries be dismissed as mere
sporadic misconduct which is sometimes to be expected of those
who are not learned in the law. It persists with such chronic regu-
larity that it is acknowledged privately by many judges as a fairly
dependable factor whose potential operation exerts a definite in-
fluence on court determinations. The judge who submits the care-
lessness of the plaintiff for the jury's consideration usually does
so aware of the fact that the harsh doctrine of contributory negli-
gence will become a dead letter in that controversy; and his de-
liberations are affected accordingly.
Unfortunately no observation on jury reactions can be con-
firmed to the same degree of certainty as a rule of law. The mo-
tivation behind the jury verdicts is not recorded and preserved in
buckram for scholarly attention. Since we are dealing with human
behavior which reacts in covert disobedience of established au-
thority the confirmation of such a proposition is made all the
harder. The current use of general verdicts in which the response
to all of several issues is merged into a single yea or nay precludes
even the making of a dependable study as to whether or not the
jury made any answer to the issue of contributory negligence, 10
much less the nature of its response.
The only available confirmation' of the proposition that juries
ignore the contributory negligence issue is the observations of
judges and lawyers who are in regular contact with the jury. This
at best is only opinion evidence which must be accepted with
""It is a current forensic commonplace that a very effective method
of destroying in action an unjust or unpopular rule is to delegate its appli-
cation to the jury." Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions
(1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 909.
-"Green, A New Development in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A.B.A.J. 715,
reprinted in Green, Judge and Jury (1930) 350.
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caution. Even the most routine negligence cases call for the con-
sideration of several distinct issues, such as negligence, causation,
contributory negligence and so on. Each of these issues focuses the
jury's attention on a different facet of the controversy. Whether
the jury placed any emphasis on the negligence of the plaintiff can
never be known with certainty. No observer, however honest and
careful he may be, can do more than submit his estimate as to
how the jury analyzed the situation. That estimate is entirely per-
sonal to him and must depend largely on the emphasis that he him-
self assigns to the various issues of the controversy. The specialized
training of the judge or lawyer serves only to make the accuracy
of his observation more uncertain, for he may tend to assume that
the jury has rationalized the situation into logical propositions with
much the same professional technique that he himself would em-
ploy. This assumption is highly undependable. Furthermore, once
it is conceded that an observer and the jury have emphasized the
same factors, the value of the observer's opinion must depend upon
the soundness of his appraisal of the case; for it is only against
this appraisal that the reaction of the jury can be weighed.
In view of the constant invitation for disagreement among ob-
servers it would be expected that little harmony of opinion could be
secured through the simple process of nose counting. By the same
token, however, a substantial concurrence one way or the other
would make all the more plausible whatever conclusion is in-
dicated. Particularly would this be true if an impressive majority
of observers were to conclude that juries largely ignore the con-
tributory negligence issue. It is to be presumed that the jury is
composed of law abiding men who attempt to apply the court's in-
structions on the law. Consequently a contrary conclusion is likley
to represent an opinion arrived at in the face of the expected order
of things and hence would be supported by persuasive evidence to
overweigh the initial presumption of regularity.
The writer's interest in the subject of juries and contributory
negligence was aroused by an observation in a casual little book
entitled "A Judge Takes the Stand," by Joseph N. Ulman. Judge
Ulman's remarks are supported by eight years of trial experience
on the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City. After acquainting his
reader with the formal law of contributory negligence, he continues:
"don't let any lawyer tell you that the law of contributory negli-
gence is what I have just said it is. At least, don't let him tell
you that this is the law of contributory negligence as it really
works in the court room, and as it will affect your rights or your
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liabilities in a real case. Probably he will not even think of telling
you so because even trained lawyers have observed that juries have
knocked this theoretical law of contributory negligence into a
cocked hat. For many years, juries have been deciding cases just as
though there was no such rule of law. And all the time judges
have been going on saying gravely that there is. Anyone with
open eyes directed either to the front or to the rear, can plainly
see that, on this point at least, the living law is jury-made far more
truly than it is judge-made."' '
He concludes that the plaintiff's carelessness has its effect only on
the amount of the verdict.
I was struck by the fact that a trial judge of ample experience
with personal injury cases should venture this sweeping generaliza-
tion. It would be interesting to learn whether Judge Ulman's ob-
servation is even partially confirmed by the experience of other
trial judges. Accordingly, I secured the names of fifty whose
opinion would be backed by at least five years of active experience
on the trial bench. Through selection and elimination a fair geo-
graphical distribution was assured, and every effort was made to
acquire a representative cross section of both urban and rural ex-
perience. I neither sought nor avoided the "scholarly" type of
judge. To those so listed I sent copies of Judge Ulman's statement
and requested their reactions.
The replies were highly gratifying, both from from the stand-
point of the number received (thirty-five of the fifty inquiries were
answered) and the interest taken by my correspondents. I believe
that I have succeeded in making a fair classification of the answers,
although sometimes re-inquiries were necessary and in four in-
stances I was unable to classify the writer's estimate with sufficient
accuracy to record his views.
Of the remaining thirty-one judges thirteen were willing to
accept without qualification judge Ulman's broad generalization
that contributory negligence as a bar to recovery is a dead issue
with juries. Three others took the position that the attitude described
is generally characteristic of the jury, although these correspondents
were unwilling to agree that it is entirely dependable. Five judges
f,jund what I may describe as a "marked tendency" to ignore the
issue, which is manifest in the general run of their determinations.
Considering this group of twenty-one collectively it can be taken
with fair assurance that these judges at least believe it more likely
than not that the jury will ignore the defense. Of the remaining
liUlman, A Judge Takes the Stand (1933) 31.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ten, three would venture only that the jury action on contributory
negligence is unpredictable, while only seven judges were in direct
opposition to Judge Ulman on the matter. This data is subject to
various interpretations and no inevitable conclusion therefrom is
urged. Unless, however, the verdict of the decided minority, rep-
resenting only twenty per cent of the observers, is to be preferred,
we can safely assume that the contributory negligence issue has
a very limited part to play in trials before juries, if, indeed, it has
any meaning at all.
Contributory Negligence and the Judge
The importance of jury action in cases involving contributory
negligence can hardly be overemphasized. The proposition that the
negligence of the- plaintiff is a proper matter for the sole determina-
tion of the jury except in rare instances is so universally accepted
that no citation of authority is needed. If the above observation on
the jury's attitude is sound, the doctrine of contributory negligence
should be regarded as an active factor only in those instances
where courts have held that the plaintiff's carelessness was so ob-
vious that recovery should be precluded as a matter of law. Thus
the doctrine is reduced in perspective to a jury control device, and
the reasons that prompt judges to so employ it and the liberality
with which it is used by them become the focal points of inquiry
for all practical purposes.
The attitude of judges toward the doctrine is not necessarily
similar to that of jurymen. Technical training and a professional
attitude toward the law plus a feeling of personal responsibility
for its proper administration are all factors which make for a
greater fidelity to established rules on the part of the judge. This
affords no assurance, however, that courts are kindly disposed
toward the contributory negligence idea, or that they will go fur-
ther than to make a sparing application of the doctrine according
to the accepted technique of deciding cases. The writer noted with
interest that the great majority of his judge correspondents volun-
teered approval of the tendency of the jury to consider contribu-
tory negligence only in mitigation of damages. Some cited the
humanizing effect of such action as one of the most commendable
features of the jury system. The doctrine of comparative negli-
gence was in decided favor even with several who did not share
Judge Ulman's observation with respect to the jury.
If this is at all representative of court attitudes, it is to be ex-
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pected that opposition to the doctrine from this quarter will have an
effect on the outcome of litigation. The influence of such an atti-
tude can operate along two separate lines: First, we would expect
to find a reluctance to interfere with jury verdicts except in ex-
treme instances. Second, in the case where the court has substi-
tuted its own judgment for that of the jury on the asserted ground
that the negligence of the plaintiff cannot be reasonably disputed,
it may le suspected that the situation did not otherwise warrant re-
covery and that the plaintiff's negligence was seized upon because
it afforded the most articulate vehicle to give expression to the
court's dissatisfaction with the manner in which the jury disposed
of the controversy.
There is no discernible reluctance by appellate courts to set
aside jury verdicts on the asserted ground that the negligence of
the plaintiff was too clear to admit of reasdnable dispute. This can
be established with fair accuracy. The writer selected two hundred
cases which appeared to involve contributory negligence as a
prominent feature and in which the jury had resolved the issue
against the plaintiff's carelessness. These were the sole criteria for
selection, and the relative merits of the controversies were other-
wise ignored. In thirty-seven per cent of these cases the appellate
courts reversed the judgment below on the ground that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This
is not conclusive for any purpose, however, unless the cases in
which the juries' verdicts are set aside represent situations where-
in recovery otherwise would be appropriate.
The use of contributory negligence as an affirmative personal
defense does not by any means exhaust the possible effects of a
plaintiff's carelessness on the course of litigation; and statements
by appellate courts that the plaintiff cannot recover because he
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law are open
to further examination. Of course it should not be presumed that
when judges say one thing they really mean something else. But
neither can we overlook the fact that unusual conduct by any per-
son, other than the defendant, who participates at the scene of
action may properly have a profound effect upon the outcome of
the case. This effect is thoroughly susceptible of discussion in
terms of contributory negligence if the actor happens to be the
plaintiff. In recognizing this fact we merely enlarge upon the
possible meaning of the language used by the courts, and no con-
tradiction is involved. The underlying philosophy of contributory
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negligence may, however, be profoundly altered according to the
purpose for which the doctrine is used. What appears at first blush
to be incompatible with prevailing notions of right and wrong
may upon reflection prove to be thoroughly acceptable. There is
no evidence that either juries or judges are reluctant to consider
the plaintiff's carelessness as a factor which may affect recovery;
it is the idea of contributory negligence as an arbitrary bar which
they find objectionable.
The plaintiff's behavior is a highly important factor in arriv-
ing at a .solution of both duty and negligence problems. Its effect
upon the extent of the burden to be shouldered by the defendant
has not escaped the attention of courts and writers. In Section 290
of the Restatement of Torts12 it is said that the defendant is
assumed to know "the qualities and habits of human beings . . .
in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time
and in the community"; and the definition of a negligent act in
Section 302 includes conduct that "creates a situation which in-
volves an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other. . . ." But it does not follow that the defendant
is required to adjust himself to the plaintiff's expectable conduct
in such manner as to reduce the risk of injury to an absolute
minimum." To impose such a requirement would be to ignore the
defendant's privilege to conduct his business or operations in such
way as will produce the greatest benefit to himself and to society.
The law of negligence is basically. a law of compromise, and in
many instances unusual conduct by the plaintiff can be met only
by extraordinary precautions requiring an inordinate degree of
diligence or an excessive outlay of time or money, or both. If the
complex business of modern living is to be carried on with any
degree of economy or efficiency, heavily trafficked streets cannot
be made a haven for sleepwalkers, nor can public places be so
constructed or attended as to be foolproof. There are practical
limits to the burdens that the defendant can shoulder. Mutual ad-
justment by both him and plaintiff is required in order to mini-
mize the risk unless the standard of reasonable conduct is to be
abandoned. This is a far cry from any notion of contributory neg-
ligence. It is not a matter of importance that the plaintiff's con-
duct was legal or illegal, reasonable or unreasonable. There is
1"Restatement, Torts (1934) Sec. 290.
13" 'It would be difficult to so arrange every part of a station as to
render it impossible for careless people to meet with injury.'" Ladd, J., in
McNaughton v. Illinois Central R. R., (1907) 136 Iowa 177, 182, 113 N. W.
844, 846.
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only one inquiry: did the plaintiff's behavior create a situation
which the defendant could meet only through an adjustment
which the court or jury is unwilling to impose upon him?
The extent to which a defendant will be forced by law to tem-
porize with the plaintiff's conduct cannot be defined in advance.
The requirement he must meet -will vary with the plaintiff's be-
havior and the defendant's ability to anticipate and meet the situ-
ation with the means which are or should be available to him.
It will vary also with the extent of the duty normally owed by
persons in the defendant's class to those so situated as plaintiff.
Other factors of equal importance must be considered later. It
is apparent that this type of problem is normally solved in terms
of duty, negligence, and even through the language of proximate
cause. But there is no one inevitable way in which the problem
must be stated in order that a fair solution be reached. A single
factor will likely appear and reappear in a decision in the garb of
different rules of law; the same problem can be rationalized sev-
eral times along successively different lines.14 Which rule will
finally be chosen may depend largely on personal preference or
on the desire to avoid entanglement with previous decisions or
established trial procedures. The choice may even be determined
by the simple comfort of expression which the chosen rule affords
over its competitors. It follows that when the question is whether
or not the plaintiff's behavior has unduly increased the defendant's
obligation one court may choose contributory negligence as a
vehicle of expression in preference to the language of duty, neg-
ligence or causation. Such a choice has at least one purely forensic
advantage. It is easier for an appellate court to rule as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
than it would be to contradict the jury's finding on the issue of
the defendant's negligence. The former practice enables the court
to maintain a false but reassuring semblance of a separation be-
tween the functions of judge and jury. This is facilitated by the
fact that incidents of plaintiff misconduct fall into a comparatively
few classifications which can be readily subtended under rules of
law. The extent to which judges may employ contributory negli-
gence as a substitute for other mediums of expression and the
"An idea may be expressed in many different ways and many of our
differences arise out of a choice of expression." Opinion of Crane, J., in
O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, (1930) 253 N. Y. 423, 435, 171 N. E.
04, 698. See also Green, The Palsgraf Case (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 789,
791.
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purposes to be served by so doing is the burden of the following
pages.
It should not be expected that all, or even substantially all,
judges will react similarly toward the negligence of the plaintiff.
Some more than others will accept literally the requirement that
the careless plaintiff is not entitled to recover. The idea that he
deserved what he got is by no means without its claim to just recog-
nition in an appropriate case. Also, some judges will insist upon
a rigid analytical structure and allocate to the negligence issue all
considerations that bear upon the defendant's burden; others will
not.
Further consideration of the suggested uses of contributory
negligence can be had only through careful study of fact situa-
tions which have lent themselves to resolution under that doctrine.
Little is to be gained, however, by random sampling. Cases in-
volving traffic and transportation with their transitory perils, fail-
ures of split second timing, negligence based on statutory viola-
tions and complications arising from the last clear chance cannot
be compared with landowner cases wherein the defendant's al-
leged negligence consists in his failure to make advance prepara-
tion and in which the plaintiff's rights vary both with his status
as trespasser or invitee and with the particular place where the
injury occurred. Situations in which invitees are injured on busi-
ness premises have been selected for consideration herein despite
certain obvious shortcomings. It is believed that the reasons sup-
porting this choice outweigh the relative disadvantages involved.
The Contributory Negligence of Business Guests and Patrons
Since we are primarily concerned with the effect that the plain-
tiff's behavior may have upon the defendant's duty it is to our
advantage that we begin with situations where the defendant's
conduct can be laid out in perspective and its worth to society
evaluated with some assurance. This is a common characteristic
of cases involving the duty owed to invitees on business premises.
These cases usually revolve around the requirement of advance
preparation by the defendant, which is a more or less static state
of affairs depending in no small measure on economic expediency.
For. this reason the values involved can be disentangled from their
respective fact situations without too much difficulty. Moreover
the alleged misconduct of the plaintiff and defendant seldom occur
simultaneously in these cases, and we are thus spared the difficult
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task of coping with time reactions and emergency adjustments. A
further advantage lies in the susceptibility of this group of cases
to fairly comprehensive treatment. No attempt has been made to
exhaust the decisions, but enough cases have been examined to
furnish a reliable cross section of typical court action in this field.
There is no assurance, however, that the conclusions drawn
from this class of situations can be indiscriminately extended to
other fields. In several respects the decisions dealing with the lia-
bility of landowners represent a unique corner of the law of neg-
ligence. We need not be reminded that toward trespassers and
licensees the duties owed by the occupier are spare indeed. 1" These
persons must constantly be on the alert for their own safety. On
the other hand, the business guest or invitee, with whom we are
concerned, is entitled to assume that affirmative precautions for
his safety have been taken, and the requirement of vigilance on his
part has been correspondingly relaxed.16 Hence the extent of self
protection required of the business guest does not necessarily
correspond to the degree of vigilance exacted of one who, for ex-
ample, is exposed to the perils of traffic on a public thoroughfare.
Other differences will doubtless occur to the reader.'7 The opinion
may be ventured, however, that differences between fact type situ-
ations may reflect differences of technique and differences in the
reasons that prompt judges to resort to the contributory negligence
doctrine, but that the attitude reflected will be substantially the
same in all classifications.
One evening H. A. Rollestone, who was in a highly intoxicated
condition, maneuvered himself into the barroom of T. Cassirer
and Company in Atlanta for the purpose of buying another drink.
But the bartender refused to serve him because of Georgia's penal
code which forbids the sale of liquor to anyone who is obviously
intoxicated. While loitering around the premises Rollestone stag-
gered, lost his footing and lunged against the massive mahogany
If'Ristatement, Torts (1934) Secs. 333, 342.
" Id. at Sec. 343, particularly comment a; Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 7,
at r(42. See also the following cases: Adams v. Schneider, (1919) 71 Ind.
App. 249, 124 N. E. 718; Lewis v. Sells-Floto Shows Co., (1916) 98 Kan.
145, 157 Pac. 397; Scott v. University of Michigan Athletic Ass'n, (1908)
152 Mich. 684, 116 N. W. 624.
'7Situations in which the carelessness of the plaintiff is successive in
point of time to that of the defendant are sometimes regarded as resting
on a basis different from that of the usual contributory negligence case. It
has been said that the doctrine of contributory negligence in such instances
is justifiable in terms of proximate cause. 1 Street, op. cit. supra note 3, at
127. This distinction, if indeed it exists at all, is only in terminology and
should have little bearing on our problem.
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bar counter. This counter, which had been installed several weeks
before, was so designed that its outside hung over from the center
of gravity, and no attempt had been made to affix it to the floor.
It fell forward under the sudden impact of Rollestone's weight
and crushed him to death.
To a mind unaffected by legal niceties there would be little
-doubt as to the propriety of a recovery by Rollestone's widow
under the facts given above. This establishment catered to the
custom of those who wanted liquor, and its patrons were drinking
and drunken persons. No, one can doubt that it owed these cus-
tomers the duty of making its premises reasonably safe against
the unstable conduct which would be characteristic of the place.
Furthermore its shortcomings were obvious and the tragic occur-
rence could have been avoided without appreciable loss or incon-
venience to the management. Any jury doubtless would have re-
turned a substantial verdict, but the trial judge entered a non-
suit in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appealed and the
defendant renewed its argument that there was no legal basis for
recovery."s
It contended that since liquor could not be sold to Rollestone
in violation of the criminal law the deceased was at best a licensee
and could not demand the exercise of reasonable care by defendant
with respect to the condition of the bar counter. The supreme
court acceded to this argument, but it labeled the defectively de-
signed and installed counter a "trap," and by so doing it neatly
avoided the advantage that the defendant hoped to gain by reason
of the deceased's lowly status.
The defendant emphasized the contributory negligence of
Rollestone, who was voluntarily intoxicated and obliviously stag-
gering around in a public place. However, the court managed to
dismiss this contention. It announced that a drunken man is re-
sponsible for his conduct to the same extent that he would be if
he were sober. Such a person, said the court, is charged with
knowledge that he is intoxicated and that his physical facilities
are correspondingly impaired. Following this line the court in-
geniously concluded that due care by a drunken person for his
own safety means only that he must prudently adjust himself to
his surrounding situation in the light of his known shortcomings.
The deceased's obligation, when thus adroitly phrased, becomes
properly a matter for the jury's attention. The case was remanded
IsRollestone v. Cassirer & Co., (1907) 3 Ga. App. 161, 59 S. E. 442.
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for trial and there is little doubt as to what disposition was made
of it thereafter. One might profitably conjecture whether the
deplorable condition of the deceased would have been so tenderly
disposed of if he had slipped on the wet floor of a theater lobby
on a rainy day or had fallen in the darkened aisle of a movie
house. In this case, as in many others we shall consider, the court's
approach to the plaintiff's negligence is but the reflection of its
attitude toward the defendant's conduct, which in the case of the
bar proprietor was wholly inexcusable."'
The duty owed by the proprietor of a business establishment
or place of amusement to his customers or patrons is commonly
defined as the requirement to use reasonable care. This generality,
however, no more adequately describes the technique through
which this type of case is handled than the terms "good judgment"
or "sound verdict" describe the operations of the court or jury.
Rcasonahleness merely means that the situation will be individual-
ized for treatment-that the plaintiff's obvious loss will be bal-
anced against the defendant's claim to do what he was doing at
the time in the way he was doing it. None of the factors that en-
tered into the balance are even suggested by this broad standard.
The defendant's alleged shortcomings may consist in the way he
designed his premises or equipment, in the manner in which they
were constructed, maintained, arranged, illuminated, or attended,
or even in the personal supervision which he exercised for the
plaintiff's safety while the latter was in his place of business.
The extent of these duties will vary sharply with the nature
and location of the place, the kind of business being conducted
there and the type of clientele to which the business caters. It
will depend to some degree on the extent to which the premises
are adaptable to standardized construction and maintenance, the
habits and demands of the public, and the permanent or transient
nature of the peril complained of. Sometimes the proprietor's
duty and breach of duty will be obvious; more often both cus-
tomer and management must make mutual adjustments; and the
requirements which are imposed upon the one must supplement
those with which the other is charged.
I"Compare with the principal case Holle v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western R. R., (1939) 122 N. J. Law 358, 5 A. (2d) 874, and Calloway,
Trustee Central of Georgia Ry. v. Hart, 11 Neg. Cases 448 (C.C.A. 5th
1944). In each of these cases an intoxicated passenger ventured into the
vestibule between the cars of a moving train on which the outer vestibule
door was carelessly left open, and was precipitated from the train. Here
again the defendant railroad's high duty is evident, and plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence was dealt with lightly by the appellate court, which
sustained the jury's finding for plaintiff in each instance.
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Design
The first of all preparations to be made by the proprietor for
the reception of his patron or customer is the evolution of a de-
sign for his business premises. The arrangement of rooms and
hallways, the establishment of floor levels and angles of ascent
and descent and the spacing of entrances and exits are only a few
of the problems that must be solved in advance of construction.
A conflict of interests is immediately presented to the prospective
operator since safety is seldom completely compatible with either
business needs or economy of construction. Yet in matters of de-
sign safety is a consideration of paramount importance, and it
will prevail unless its demands exceed all bounds of economic
tolerance, which is not often the case. In laying out his establish-
ment on paper the proprietor has ample time for a leisurely reckon-
ing with all contingencies which may present themselves. Likewise
there is available for his use the collected experience of those
who have built similar structures before him. This information
includes the standards and practices of architects and engineers
and the provisions of building codes and related statutes. These
formulae are usually drawn so as to allow a wide margin of safety,
and provision is made for excessive uses as well as for those
which are to be expected regularly. Actions for injuries occasioned
by defective design are usually characterized by the testimony of
experts and are decided along the line of conformity with profes-
sionally accepted standards. Recovery is normally to be expected
if the injury was occasioned by a shortcoming in design which
was a substantial cause of the accident.
Here, as elsewhere, the contributory negligence of the patron
is frequently urged as a reason for refusing recovery. However,
the defense has had little or no appeal for the courts, who are
likely to feel that adequate design would have included prepara-
tion for the prospect of the plaintiff's carelessness. Consequently,
contributory negligence in this type of case has with singular
unanimity been left in the hands of the jury, with results which
would be expected.2 ° The cases wherein the plaintiff was held to
2OLong v. John Breuner Co., (1918) 30 Cal. App. 630, 172 Pac. 1132(paved incline leading to defendant's store constructed on excessive grade) ;
Madigan v. 0. A. Hale & Co., (1928) 90 Cal. App. 151, 265 Pac. 574 (defec-
tive cleats on runways) ; Rhodius v. Johnson, (1900) 21 Ind. App. 401. 56
N. E. 942 (confusing room arrangement in saloon, lighting inadequate; plain-
tiff ventured into the darkness and fell) ; Cousineau v. Muskegon Traction &
Lighting Co., (1906) 145 Mich. 314, 108 N. W. 720 (plaintiff crushed
in crowd awaiting public conveyance; peril could have been minimized
through installation of railings) ; Dilley v. Baltimore Transit Co., (Md.
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be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law clearly
showed at most only spare evidence of carelessness on the part of
the defendant with respect to the design of his premises." Similar
considerations apply to the arrangement of movable objects which
are to have a fairly stable location, such as scales, counters, and
display stands.--
Sometimes public habits and tastes or the demands of economy
have so profound an effect upon the requirements of design that
the safety factor is subordinated. An excellent illustration is af-
forded by the numerous cases in which a patron seated in the
App. 1944) 39 A. (2d) 469 (same facts); Hale v. McLaughlin, (1931)
274 Mass. 308, 174 N. E. 506 (aisle between seats in theater did not pro-
vide adequate leg space; patron's foot extending under seat ahead was
crushed when seat was raised) ; Blakeley v. White Star Line, (1908) 154
Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482 (arrangement of dance pavilion in close proximity
to baseball diamond; spectator at dances struck by ball); Poppleston v.
Pantages Minneapolis Theater Co., (1928) 175 Minn. 153, 220 N. W. 418
(plaintiff fell down stairway leading to rest room in theater; steps
improperly designed and inadequately lighted); Steinke v. Palladium
Amusement Co., (Mo. App. 1930) 28 S. W. (2d) 440 (skating rink so
designed as to allow skaters onto outside promenade; patrons skated
through unlatched door into excavation twelve feet below) ; Bloomer v.
Snellenburg, (1908) 221 Pa. 25, 69 Atl. 1124 (incline of cross aisle formed
perpendicular obstruction); Hommel v. Badger State Inv. Co., (1917) 166
Wis. 238, 165 N. W. 20 (five inch riser immediately in front of inner door
in vestibule of public building; plaintiff's carelessness appears to be obvious).
Cases involving the liability of the proprietors of motion picture estab-
lishments, swimming pools and places of amusement frequently involve
errors in design. These situations constitute special problems and will be
considered separately.
"lSee, for example, Shorkey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
(1932) 259 Mich. 450, 243 N. W. 257 (plaintiff's heel slipped through the
grill of a hot air register; the register was of a common type and had been
in use for four years without a mishap; several members of the court ex-
pressly rested their ruling on absence of negligence alone). See also Murphy
v. Cohen, (1916) 223 Mass. 54, 111 N. E. 771 (real estate agent exhibiting
defendant's apartment during latter's absence tripped and fell on narrow
stairway; premises were obviously not prepared for business use) ; Mullen v.
Sensenbrenner 'Mercantile Co., (Mo. 1924) 260 S. W. 982, 33 A. L. R. 176
(paved incline leading to defendant's store conformed to prevailing grade for
similar structures).
Often the plaintiff's own carelessness is used by the courts merely to
bolster a decision which the court has adequately explained on the ground
of absence of negligence. Such statements as "the accident was due to the
plaintiff's own inattention" are common. See Larned v. Vanderlinde, (1911)
165 Mich. 464, 131 N. W. 165.
*..2Ober v. The Golden Rule, (1920) 146 Minn. 347, 178 N. W. 586 (cur-
tain display stands placed in aisles and defectively designed; contributory
negligence held for jury). With this case compare Reed v. L. Hammel Dry
Goods Co., (1927) 215 Ala. 494, 111 So. 237 and Seabridge v. Poli, (1922)
98 Conn. 297, 119 Atl. 214. These cases deal with weighing scales in public
places. In both instances the devices appear to have been located with due
regard for safety and had been at the same place for several years without
mishap. In the first case there was a jury verdict for defendant, and in the
latter instance the plaintiff was held guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
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bleachers of a baseball stadium is struck by a foul ball during
either the course of the game or in practice. Almost without excep-
tion recovery is denied in this situation. The decisions are explained
indiscriminately in terms of either contributory negligence or as-
sumption of risk by the patron."
Beyond question the results reached in the baseball cases is
satisfactory, but resort to the plaintiff's carelessness or self expo-
sure as an explanation is unnecessary and has given rise to con-
siderable confusion and even to useless litigation. Neither does
the choice between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
materially affect the matter. It has been said that the doctrine of
assumed risk is used indiscriminately to cover situations where
the plaintiff has expressly or impliedly consented to the defend-
ant's misconduct as well as situations where he has imprudently
exposed himself and is thus contributorily negligent.!" Under either
view, the plaintiff is regarded as being disqualified from maintain-
ing his action because of his own conduct in a case in which re-
covery may otherwise be appropriate. The two doctrines are used
interchangeably by the courts in all the landowner cases and the
same considerations seem to determine the use of both contributory
negligence and assumed risk.
The traditional American baseball field is a standardized prod-
uct of the development of the game and reflects the tastes of
the baseball fan. The familiar design of an enclosed and protected
grandstand and the exposed bleachers section is found in nearly
every hamlet as well as the largest cities. Custom, as well as the
needs of economy, has produced a uniform layout which satisfac-
23Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, (Cal. App. 1934) 35 P. (2d) 602;
Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., (1931) 16 La App.
95, 133 So. 408; Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, (1932)
185 Minn. 507, 240 N. W. 903; Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibi-
tion Co., (1913) 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S. XV. 1076; Brummerhoff v. St.
Louis Nat. Baseball Club, (Mo. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 382; Hudson v.
Kansas City Baseball Club, Inc., (1942) 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S. W. (2d) 318;
Blackhall v. Albany Baseball & Amusement Co., Inc., (1936) 157 Misc.
801, 285 N. Y. Supp. 695; Adonnino v. Village of Mount Morris, (1939)
171 Misc. 383, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 658; Paxton v. Buffalo International Base-
ball Club, (1939) 256 App. Div. 887. 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 42; Zeitz v. Coopers-
town Baseball Centennial, Inc., (Sup. Ct. 1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 56;
Ivory v. Cincinnati Baseball Club, (1939) 62 Ohio App. 514, 24 N. E. (2d)
837; Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 150 S. W.
(2d) 368; Williams v. Houston Baseball Ass'n, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 154
S. W. (2d) 874; Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n, (1919) 105 Wash.
219, 181 Pac. 679, reversing (1919) 105 Wash. 215, 177 Pac. 776. noted
in (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 594 and (1919) 5 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 331.24Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7, at Sec. 57. Professor Prosser regards
the baseball cases as examples of the implied consent phenomenon (id. at
377).
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torily meets the needs of the game. A stadium protected in all
its areas would prove financially disastrous to management, par-
ticularly in the smaller places, and would outrage many devotees
of baseball who like to watch the game without obstruction.21 Thus
the cost of the residuum of danger which results from the use
of the customary design should not be thrust upon the manage-
ment, which cannot further reduce the risk without exorbitant
outlay and inconvenience. Of course custom has dictated no arbi-
trary limit to the size of the area which must be screened, and
marginal situations have arisen from time to time. These have
been properly disposed of as a matter for the jury's consideration. 26
-"'The evidence shows that the seats behind the screen are the ones
that are customarily looked upon by the patrons with the least favor; seats
usually being desired in the open portions of the stands, preferably along
the first and third base lines ...
"With the results of the play so much dependent on chance, and espe-
cially so as regards the course to be taken by batted balls, the game of
baseball could hardly be played without some small element of risk of
injury to spectators. Almost every one attending a game desires to witness
it from a vantage point as near the diamond as his good fortune and purse
will permit, and yet the nearer one is to the diamond the greater is the
risk of injury from balls coming into the stands. The entire stands might
indeed be screened in and practically all chance of injury to spectators be
removed, but the perils of the game are not so great as to require such an
extreme precaution, and, furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge
that a large part of those who attend the games prefer to sit where there
is no screen to obscure their view. And so it is that the management of
the game finds itself in the dilemma where it must cater to the wishes of
the great majority of its patrons who prefer their seats in the open, and
yet it appreciates that it must nevertheless screen off that portion of its
stands where the greater number of foul balls may be expected to go and
the greater danger is to be encountered, out of all of which has undoubtedly
grown the general practice of erecting a screen behind home plate, with
the stands facing other portions of the field left open, unless it may be, as in
defendant's park, that screens are sometimes erected at other places for the
purpose of cutting down extra base hits so as to add to what is believed to
be the interest in the game." Bennick, Comm'r, in Grimes v. American
League Baseball Co., (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 520, 522, 523.
-",Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club of the Pacific Coast League,
(1938) 27 Cal. App. (2d) 733, 81 P. (2d) 625 (patron seated at edge of
screened portion struck by bat; screen extended eighty feet) ; Wells v. Min-
neapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, (1913) 122 finn. 327, 142 N. W. 706
(screen covered only sixty-five feet of grandstand) ; Olds v. St. Louis Nat.
Baseball Club, (Mo. App. 1937) 104 S. W. (2d) 746 (issue of whether de-
fendant should screen passages leading from grandstand to nearest exit held
for jury). Compare Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, (1929) 130 Ore. 93,
279 Pac. 277, where one hundred fifty feet were protected and the court
refused to submit to the jury an issue as to whether defendant should have
extended wings of the screen back into the grandstand.
It would be interesting to know in these cases what matters the jury
is supposed to consider in determining the issue of "implied consent." See
note 24. supra.
In Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., (1914) 181 Mo.
App. 327, 168 S. V. 908, plaintiff was struck by a ball which passed through
a defective netting. In answer to defendant's contention that plaintiff as-
sumed the risk the court replied: "If the Kansas City Blues had kept their
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A straightforward disposition of these baseball cases could be
made through the simple expedient of a directed verdict for the
defendant on the negligence issue whenever it appears that the
latter's alleged carelessness consisted merely in his failure to de-
part from the traditional design in his structure. The first of this
line of cases, Crane v. Kansas City Baseball ad Exhibition Corn-
pany0' was decided largely on this ground, and the court need not
have gone further.2  However, it chose to emphasize that the
plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by voluntarily choosing
an unprotected seat, and added: "And if it could not be said that
he assumed the risk, still he should not be allowed to recover,
since his own contributory negligence is apparent and indispu-
table." 29 Following the Crane'decision the disposition of this type
of case in terms of contributory negligence or assumption of risk
became current coin.
However, the true considerations that underlie the baseball
cases have never been departed from. Since absence of negligence
is the reason for refusing recovery it is immaterial whether the
plaintiff did or did not know of the risk. So long as the customary
protected area is provided it makes no difference whether the
patron chose the bleachers through choice or because the grand-
stands were filled. The courts have faithfully adhered to this
position although distinctions based on lack of knowledge of the
game and the crowded conditions of the grandstand have been per-
sistently urged upon them. A frequent answer given is that by
entering the unenclosed portion the patrorl is deemed to have as-
sumed the risk as a matter of law." It is obvious that when a fact
is thus conclusively presumed it has lost its evidentiary signifi-
cance. 31 Other courts have considered each situation upon its
eyes on the ball with the accuracy defendant says plaintiff should have dis-
played, they would have attained a higher place in the race for the pennant."
(168 S. W. at 910.)2-7(1913) 168 Mo. App. 301, 153 S. W. 1076.
-SMost of the opinions contain clear denials that defendant was negli-
gent. In Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., (1939) 215 N. C. 64, 1 S. E.
(2d) 131, the decision is properly rested on this ground alone.
29 (1913) 168 Mo. App. at 305, 153 S. W. at 1078.
3OBrisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, (1932) 185 Minn.
507, 240 N. W. 903; Brummerhoff v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, (Mo.
App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 382; Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass'n,
(1919) 105 Wash. 219, 181 Pac. 679, reversing (1919) 105 Wash. 215, 177
Pac. 776.
31"It is now common" learning that the common law judges have made
extensive use of the device of presumptions for two purposes: to control
the jury in its function of fact finding, and to change the accepted rules of
the common law without the appearance of judicial legislation." Morgan,
supra, note 9, at 909.
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merits but have inevitably concluded that the plaintiff knowingly
exposed himself. -"
In interesting contrast to the baseball cases is the situation
where a spectator at a hockey game is struck by a flying puck. The
flying puck, like a foul ball, is a fairly frequent occurrence. How-
ever, the courts have quite properly held that the spectator sitting
in an unprotected portion of the coliseum does not assume the risk
of injury as a matter of law, 3 and these cases are usually sub-
:"-'See the excellent and extended discussion in Hudson v. Kansas City
Baseball Club, Inc., (1942) 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S. W. (2d) 318. In Keys v.
Alamo City Baseball Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 150 S.. W. (2d) 368,
plaintiff was unfamiliar with the game and urged that the management
should have instructed her as to the perils of sitting in the exposed bleachers.
The court replied: "It would have been absurd, and no doubt would have
been resented by many patrons, if the ticket seller, or other employees, had
warned each person entering the park that he or she would be imperiled by
vagrant balls in unscreened areas. And yet that would have been defendant's
duty, if plaintiff's contention is sound. We overrule that contention." (150
S. W. (2d) at 371.) Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, (Cal. App. 1934) 35
P. (2d) 602; Adonnino v. Village of 'Mount Morris, (1939) 171 Misc. 383, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 658.
Several variations of the usual picture which have been considered re-
inforce the conclusion that the results reached in the baseball cases are
not properly grounded upon assumption of risk or contributory negligence.
In Cincinnati Baseball Club v. Eno, (1925) 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N. E. 86,
a patron seated in the bleachers during the practice preceding the game was
struck in the face by a ball batted from a point outside the diamond and
near the grandstand. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that assumption
of risk by the plaintiff was a proper matter for the jury's consideration.
Again in Grimes v. American League Baseball Co., (Mo. App. 1935) 78
S. W. (2d) 520, temporary stands for a forthcoming World Series game
had been erected on either side of the catcher's box and protruded abotit
fifteen feet into the field. A ball rebounded from this structure and struck the
plaintiff who was seated outside the protected grandstand. A jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal and the plea of contributory
negligence was dismissed.
The explanation of both these cases is simple. Although the courts are
not willing to require extraordinary protection in the way of design of the
stadium, they are prepared to submit to the jury issues as to whether the
management should exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
players or should encumber the field with temporary structures in advance
of the need. Compare Brummerhoff v. St. Louis Nat. Baseball Club, (Mo.
App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 382 and Zeitz v. Cooperstown Baseball Cen-
tenniaj, Inc., (Sup. Ct. 1941) 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 56.
:':'Thurman v. Ice Palace, (1939) 36 Cal. App. (2d) 364, 97 P. (2d) 999;
Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., (1936) 296 Mass. 168, 5
N. E. (2d) 1; Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass'n, Inc., (1940) 307 Iass.
102, 29 N. E. (2d) 716; James v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., (1938)
t.0 R. 1. 405, 199 Adt. 293. Contra: Ingersoll v. Onondoga Hockey Club,
Inc., (1935) 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. Supp. 505. That the New York
Appellate Division nevertheless regarded the problem as one of negligence
is apparent from the following statement: "The risk of being hit by a base-
ball or by a puck at a hockey game is a risk incident to the entertainment and
is assumed by the spectators. Any other rule of law would place an
unreasonable burden upon the operator of a ball park or hockey rink." (281
N. Y. Supp. at 508.)
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mitted to the jury with resulting verdicts for the plaintiff. The
usual explanation, that the spectator at the more novel game of
hockey is not presumed to know the perils, is not very convincing
in view of the fact that ignorance of the dangers of baseball has
not in practice been accorded recognition by the courts. The basis
of the distinction between the two sports appears to rest on the mat-
ter of negligence by the management. Unlike the baseball stadium,
the hockey coliseum does not have a standardized design so far
as screening and other protections are concerned. 3 ' Nor is the
expense of adequate safeguards likely to be a serious burden on
the proprietor. There is no spectator habit opposed to screening,
which has already been installed without objection or undue ex-
pense in addition to other safeguards in more than one-fourth of
the stadiums. Considerations similar to those that control the base-
ball and hockey cases appear to underlie many other decisions on
injuries to spectators at sporting events. 35
Accidents in Remote Parts of Busiwss Premises
A business guest is not entitled to assume that all parts of the
premises have been prepared for his reception. It is commonly
34A study of nineteen coliseums reveals that the floor heights above the
ice vary from level to forty-two inches. End screens vary from five to ten
feet in height and from twenty-six feet to one hundred thirty feet in length.
Side screens, when used, vary from one and a half to three feet in height.(All figures as of June, 1940.)33In each of the following cases the spectator's assumption of risk
or contributory negligence was held properly for the jury, with the inevitable
plaintiff verdict: Arnold v. State, (1914) 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N. Y.
Supp. 479 (injury at race track when car driven by Barney Oldfield skidded
due to a blowout; large crowds permitted to gather outside grandstand
along curves) ; Zieman v. World Amusement Service Ass'n of South Dakota,
Inc., (1929) 209 Iowa 1298, 288 N. W. 48 (facts similar; racing car left
track due to negligently installed steering wheel) ; Ellingson v. World
Amusement Service Ass'n, (1928) 175 Minn. 563, 222 N. W. 335 (facts
similar; ropes provided to keep crowds away from track were allowed
to be lowered) ; Thompson v. Lowell, L. and H. St. Ry., (1898) 170 Mass.
577, 49 N. E. 913 (piece of steel bullet ricocheted off defective butt and struck
spectator in the eye).
For an interesting discussion of the risk of injury to spectators at
a semiprofessional cricket game on an improvised temporary field see Hall
v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club [C.A. 1933] 1 K. B. 205, 209. In Ingerson
v. Shattuck School, (1931) 185 'Minn. 16, 239 N. W. 667, noted in (1932)
30 Mich. L. Rev. 1121, a spectator was injured at a football game on the
premises of a preparatory school where she was hit by a player tackled
at the side line. Such games were infrequent and the admission charge was
small. The alleged negligence consisted in a failure to provide a rope bar-
ricade or fence, although a small grandstand had been erected. In refusing
recovery the Minnesota court found that defendant was not negligent. In
view of this finding, the court's statement that it would not hold that
plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law was unnecessary and must
be accepted with caution.
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said that when he enters places where he is not entitled to be or
where his presence is merely tolerated he loses his status as busi-
ness guest and is regarded as a bare licensee or even a trespasser.36
With this demotion he loses his right to assume that provisions
have been made for his safety and must be on the alert for his own
protection. This limitation merely reflects the need to consider the
extent of the burden which can properly be thrust upon the occu-
pier and in no way bears the imprint of a defense arising out of
the plaintiff's personal fault.
This type of duty classification, depending upon the status of
the plaintiff, can at best afford a mere approximation of justice.
Business premises do not lend themselves to arbitrary division
into areas where the customer's presence is or is not allowed.
Places which are frequented regularly by large numbers of peo-
ple will require more preparation and closer attendance than re-
mote areas where fewer people are likely to be and which may be
lrimarily dedicated to important purposes other than the reception
of the public. Such an area need not be a place where the presence
cf customers is not tolerated, nor need it be so obscure that the
plaintiff must be regarded as a licensee while he is there. WYhat we
find is a paring down of the requirements on the management as
the presence of customers at a given locale becomes increasingly
less frequent and more remote in its bearing on the public rela-
tionship features of the business.
As the burden on the proprietor is relaxed it is to be expected
that the corresponding duty of vigilance on the part of the cus-
tomer will be increased. There are many areas in most business
establishments where limited preparation only is demanded, and
where the remaining danger must be met by some degree of cau-
tion by the customer if he is to avoid injury. The apportionment
of the obligation between the parties is a fine task of social en-
gineering and requires careful court administration in the interest
of fair play.
Recourse to a shifting of plaintiff's status from that of business
guest to licensee or trespasser can be had only in situations
at the extreme of the scale. The duty concept is therefore entirely
lacking in flexibility from the above type situation. The most fluent
vehicle for the administration of these cases is a resort to the con-
tributory negligence of the customer or patron, and there are many
:wRestatement, Torts (1934) Sec. 343, Comment b; Prosser, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 640.
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cases in which courts have held contributorily negligent a busi-
ness guest who was injured on some comparatively unfrequented
part of the premises. Common among these are situations in which
storage rooms are infrequently used for entrance ways by cus-
tomers with the consent of the management,37 or injury is occa-
sioned through the permitted use of an obscure doorway designed
for entry of employees or for some special purpose." We can
similarly account for cases in which customers are injured while
availing themselves of some requested facility not ordinarily of-
fered.3 9
Although the advance preparation required of the defendant
may be less exacting with respect to places which are not fre-
quented by the public and are devoted to the activities of the pro-
prietor and his employees, yet if permission to enter such an area
is granted the business guest and the latter is accompanied by
either the proprietor or his representative, or if an ample opportu-
nity is presented for a personal warning of special dangers, the
guest's alleged negligence is likely to be regarded by the court
as a proper issue only for the jury.40 Of course, in many of these
cases there is a special personal undertaking by the management
for the safety of the guest, and it is not to be expected that the
latter will, in fact, be guilty of contributory negligence when he is
justifiably off his guard.
Injuries in Poorly Illuminated or Dark Areas
Under modern conditions there is- no satisfactory justification
for inadequate lighting in those parts of business premises which
are frequented by the general public. Poor illumination deprives
37Bedell v. Berkey, (1889) 76 fich. 435, 43 N. W. 308; Johnson v.
Ramberg, (1892) 49 Minn. 341, 51 N. W. 1043; Massey v. Seller, (1904)
45 Ore. 267, 77 Pac. 397.38Hammer v. Liberty Baking Co., (1935) 220 Iowa 229, 260 N. W.
720 (use of employees' entrance to bakery) ; Hendershott v. Modern Vood-
men of America, (1911) 66 Wash. 155, 119 Pac. 2 (use of rear door to
theater designed primarly as fire escape).
'
9In the following instances the guest was held to be guilty of con-
tributory negligence: Foshee v. Grant, (1922) 152 La. 303, 93 So. 102 (room
in rear of saloon used for storage, but customers were occasionally served
there; plaintiff's buttocks were scalded when he sat on top of a keg satur-
ated in lye solution) ; Clark v. Cleveland Drug Co., (1933) 204 N. C. 628,
169 S. E. 217 (customer fell into unlighted basement after using phone in
prescription division in rear of drug store) ; King v. Thackers, Inc., (1935)
207 N. C. 869, 178 S. E. 95 (customer requested use of employee's toilet in
rear of restaurant; slipped on cornmeal on kitchen floor).
40O'Brien v. Tatum, (1888) 84 Ala. 186, 4 So. 158; J. G. Christopher
Co. v. Russell, (1912) 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45; Blease v. Webher, (1919)
232 fass. 171, 122 N. E. 192; Brown v. Stevens, (1904) 136 Mich. 311, 99
N. W. 12.
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the business guest of his opportunity to guard against hazards
which could not otherwise be obviated by the proprietor. There-
fore in cases in which poor illumination plays an important part
there is an observable leniency on the part of the courts toward
the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence. 41 Particularly is this
true where defective design is also chargeable against the defend-
ant.42 It should be borne in mind, however, that dimly lighted por-
tions of the premises are often obviously out of bounds for the
business guest and are dedicated only to occasional uses of a
private nature. For this reason the considerations discussed in the
preceding paragraphs may prevail despite the fact that remote
areas can often be made safer for the expected occasional entry
by the public through the use of adequate lighting without undue
burden on the management.4
When the business guest ventures into complete darkness the
problem assumes a slightly different aspect. At first blush it would
appear that the shortcomings of the proprietor are all the more
obvious where he wholly neglects his obligation to provide lights,
and one would expect that the negligence of the customer would
be readily ignored in these situations. However, it has been often
asserted that the obligation of the management with respect to
dangerous premises can be met by an adequate warning as well
as by removing the peril. '14 It may be doubted that such a substi-
tute will always be'accepted by the courts, particularly with re-
spect to places which are thrown open to the public at large and
where the duty of self-protection may be unduly heavy.45 This,
'
1 Morgan v. Saks, (1905) 143 Ala. 139, 38 So. 848; Kennedy v. Phillips,
(1928) 319 Mo. 573, 5 S. W. (2d) 33.
l2Hill Grocery Co. v. Hameker, (1921) 18 Ala. App. 84, 89 So. 850;
Rhodius v. Johnson, (1900) 21 Ind. App. 401, 56 N. E. 942; Kennedy v.
Phillips, (1928) 319 Mo. 573, 5 S. W_ (2d) 33.
l3-Budell v. Berkey, (1889) 76 Mich. 435, 43 N. W. 308; M1assey v.
Seller, (1904) 45 Ore. 267, 77 Pac. 397.14Restatement, Torts (1934) Sec. 343 c(ii).
--If the duty to warn were in all cases an adequate substitute for the
duty to prepare, as set forth in the Restatement, all the so-called voluntary
assumption of risk cases where the business guest encounters a known peril
could be easily rationalized as instances where failure of the manage-
ment to fulfill this substitute obligation to warn was not a cause in fact
of the injury. However, it is submitted that the defendant cannot exonerate
himself by warning where other safeguards are readily available and where
the convenience of the customer would be seriously interfered with by a
failure to remedy the dangerous condition. Therefore the courts are not
willing to define once and for all the limits within which the giving of a
warning would be an adequate discharge of the proprietor's obligations,
and they prefer to snipe at the problem from ambush through the use
of the evasive language of assumed risk or contributory negligence. See
cases cited in notes 52, 53 and 55, infra.
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however, seldom characterizes the area which is left in complete
darkness. Consequently the courts are confronted with the propo-
sition that darkness affords its own warning, and the guest who
ventures into a completely darkened room knows that here is no
place of safety. To term this an assumption of risk is merely to
emphasize again the inseparability between the concept of negli-
gence and the so-called personal defenses we are considering.
The fact that the duty of the proprietor can be discharged by
warning is perhaps an instance of the individualism of the common
law which is receding in the face of modern conditions. Conse-
quently an unevenness in the effect to be given the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence in these situations is to be expected. However
there is a well marked tendency on the part of the courts to hold
that a plaintiff who suffers injury as a result of his voluntary en-
trance into a darkened room either assumes the risk or is guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
40
One comparatively large group of cases dealing with injuries
in darkened places deserves special mention. These are the situa-
tions involving accidents in motion picture theaters. Such a place
necessarily operates in partial darkness; too much light interferes
with the patron's enjoyment of the picture. On the other hand.
absolute darkness would increase the already existing peril to in-
tolerable limits. Between these two extremes there is a wide range
both with respect to the extent of illumination to be provided and
the placing of such lights as are used. Furthermore, supplemental
means of minimizing the danger must be considered. The arrange-
ment of seats, the incline and surfacing of aisles, the presence of
obstructions or sudden changes in floor level, and the provision
of ushers or other attendants-all these are matters of importance.
Where is the line that marks ordinary care?
There is considerable diversity of opinion on the extent of
the burden to be imposed on the management of motion picture
theaters. Some considerations would seem to call for a very ex-
acting standard of care. Large numbers of the public are induced
to enter a dark place where the situation is necessarily dangerous,
40Steger v. Immen, (1909) 157 Mich. 494, 122 N. W. 104; McVeagh v.
Bass, (1933) 110 Pa. Super. 379, 171 Ad. 486; Johnson v. Willcox, (1890)
135 Pa. 217, 19 Atl. 939. With these cases compare Donaldson v. Kemper,
(1939) 149 Kan. 330, 87 P. (2d) 535; Palmer v. Boston Penny Savings
Bank, (1938) 301 Mass. 540, 17 N. E. (2d) 899, where there was a confus-
ing arrangement of doorways and little opportunity for choice by plaintiff, or
where the proprietor preceded plaintiff into darkness, thus impliedly assur-
ing her that she could enter with safety.
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and where the conditions are within the almost exclusive control
of the management. If the proprietor is to be allowed to utilize dim
lighting for commercial profit, it may be that he should answer for
any accident which is the natural outgrowth of the semi-darkened
cInditions. Some of the decisions emphasize these factors which
call for extreme care and indicate that the duty of the proprietor
is somewhat analogous to that of the common carrier. Other
courts have been impressed by the dilemma of the proprietor, who
is faced with a conflict between the demands of safety and those
necessary for successful operation, and many of the opinions mani-
fest a leniency toward the defendant..48 The motion picture, like
baseball, is an entrenched American institution which must be
made available at a modest cost to poor and rich alike in all sec-
ticins of the country. The standardized plans and arrangements
which have grown up reflect a compromise, and these should be
given weight in determining whether or not the management should
be responsible for a given misadventure.
This difference of opinion is necessarily reflected in the po-
sition taken with respect to the patron's duty to protect himself,
and we find a striking inconsistency of attitude in the cases where
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is in issue. There is
a tendency-not too well defined-to hold that the patron assumes
the risk or is contributorily negligent when nothing beyond the
usual obscurity of movie houses is discoverable.49 Where, howevei*,
there are defects of design or failure by the management to utilize
17Birmingham Amusement Co. v. Norris, (1927) 216 Ala. 138, 141,
112 So. 633, 635, 53 A. L. R. 840, 843; Bentz v. Saenger-Ehrlich Enter-
prises, Inc., (La. App. 1940) 197 So. 659, 661.
The same tendency toward strict liability is manifest in all cases where
large numbers of the public are invited as spectators at entertainments
or sporting events and plaintiff is injured by reason of the collapse of a de-
ftective seating structure. Scott v. University of Michigan Athletic Ass'n,
(1908) 152 Mich. 684, 116 N. W. 624, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 234. 125 Am.
St. Rep. 423, 15 Ann. Cas. 515; Sellmer v. Ringling, (1915) 62 Pa. Super.
410, 411, approved in Durning v. Hyman, (1926) 286 Pa. 376, 133 Atl. 568.
%'See Dire v. Balaban and Katz, (1926) 241 Ill. App. 199, 203; Ross-
ton v. Sullivan, (1932) 278 'Mass. 31. 35, 179 N. E. 173, 175; Falk v.
Stanley Fabian Corp., (1935) 115 N. J. Law 141, 142, 178 AtI. 740, 741.
",Olsen v. Edgerly, (1939) 106 Ind. App. 223, 18 N. E. (2d) 937;
Pattison v. Livingston Amusement Co., (1913) 156 App. Div. 368, 141
N. Y. Supp. 588; Espel v. Cincinnati Walnut Theater Amusement Co.,
(1925) 20 Ohio App. 470, 152 N. E. 684; Loew's Nashville & Knoxville
Corp. v. Durrett, (1934) 18 Tenn. App. 489, 79- S. W. (2d) 598. Contra:
Andre v. 'Mertens, (1916) 88 N. J. Law 626, 96 Atl. 893; Gibbons v.
Balaban & Katz Corp.. (1926) 242 Ill. App. 524; Central Amusement Co.
v. Van Nostran, (1926) 85 Ind. App. 476, 152 N. E. 183, with which com-
pare Givens v. De Soto Bldg. Co., (1924) 156 La. 377, 100 So. 534.
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some available safety device, the courts usually accept the jury's
finding that the patron was .free from fault.50
Transitory Perils
With respect to the design and lighting of the premises the
occupier has an ample opportunity for advance preparation and
the exercise of deliberate judgment. For this reason we have seen
that he is likely to be held strictly accountable for his errors, sub-
ject only to the limits of economic tolerance. The problem becomes
more difficult, however, when the asserted shortcoming of the man-
agement is an improper adjustment of its conduct to the con-
stantly shifting scene of daily operations. Transitory perils are a
recurrent feature in every business establishment. They may arise
from the conduct either of the proprietor or the patrons or they
may be the result of conditions for which neither is responsible.
Inadvertence by the management is the mainspring of liability
in this type of case.
Through what agency was the peril created? What opportunity
and what means were available for its removal? To what extent
did efficient conduct of the business demand a toleration of some
temporary danger? Was the hazard enhanced by defective design
or faulty illumination? These considerations, and more, must lie
reckoned with by the judge and jury in disposing of the transitory
peril cases. Each situation is unique and demands some degree
of cooperative vigilance by both management and customer if
mischances are to be avoided.
The contributory negligence of the plaintiff or his assumption
of the risk is frequently resorted to in actions arising out of
transitory perils whenever the court feels that the jury in its en-
thusiasm to distribute the wealth has lost the proper perspective
with reference to the defendant's predicament, A customer slips
in a puddle of slush which the storekeeper either has not had the
opportunity to remove or where the persistent recurrence of slush
5OBranch v. Klatt, (1911) 165 Mich 666, 131 N. W. 107 (defectively
designed entrance way; darkness here not necessary to conduct of theater) ;
Nephler v. Woodward, (1906) 200 Mo. 179, 98 S. W. 488; Dondero v.
Tenant 'Motion Picture Co., (1920) 94 N. J. Law 483, 110 Atl. 911 (spec-
tator tripped on defective rug); Bennetts v. Silver Bow Amusement Co.,
(1922) 65 Mont. 340, 211 Pac. 336 (seats indiscriminately raised above
aisle level) ; Emery v. Midwest Amusement & Realty Co., (1933) 125 Neb.
54, 248 N. W. 804 (theater equipped with hooded lights in aisles, which
were off at time of accident; patron knew of existence of lights and de-
pended on them) ; Magruder v. Columbia Amusement Co., (1927) 218 Ky.
761, 292 S. W. 341 (seats four or five inches above aisle level).
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accumulations overtaxes all reasonably available facilities. Where
tine court will resolve such a controversy in favor of the manage-
ment in terms of absence of negligence' another court with equal
ease will foreclose the matter by holding that the customer as-
sumed the risk or was guilty of contributory negligence. 2 Pos-
sibly Ossa may be heaped upon Pelion and both devices will be
resorted to. It may be a matter of some concern to a literal ob-
server that a customer assumes the risk of falling by reason of
the presence on the floor of liquid from a broken bottle dropped
by a stranger only immediately theretofore, 3 while he does not
assume a similar risk with reference to peanut hulls which had
been on the floor for several hours preceding the accident. 4.
If the management itself created the temporary condition of
danger for some purpose of its own, the court must determine
whether the game was worth the candle. Where the management
of a drugstore elected to conduct its waxing operations during its
busiest hours and over the entire floor area of its establishment
simultaneously, a patron who saw the wax one inch deep in places
but nevertheless encountered the slippery floor to her misfortune
did not assume the risk as a matter of law."5 The court, in-holding
that her conduct should be passed upon by the jury, drew the
cryltic distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" risks
-the latter were not assumed except within the jury's discretion.
On the other hand, where the proprietor of a self-service grocery
:'Bodine v. Goerke Co., (1926) 102 N. J. Law 642, 133 Att. 295;
S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, (1927) 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N. E. 174.
'Bridgeford v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., (1921) 191 Ky. 557, 231 S. W.
22. Compare Correira v. Atlantic Amusement Co., (1938) 302 Mass. 81,
1S N. E. (2d) 435, where water and slush had accumulated in the lobby
,if a thcater for an hour and a half to the knowledge of attendants, who
had made no effort to remove it. The plaintiff who saw the condition and
attempted to pass through it was held not to have assumed the risk. The
same result was reached in Majestic Theater Co. v. Lutz, (1925) 210 Ky.
92. 275 S. NV. 16, where the danger was aggravated by defective design.
'F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Graham, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 257 S. W.
574.
'1Langley v. F. XVN. Woolworth Co., (1925) 47 R. I. 165, 131 Atl. 194.
- Ralstt,-n v. Merritt. (1935) 117 Pa. Super. 487, 178 Atl. 159. See also
R,,inson v. F. W. Woolworth. (1927) 80 Mont. 431, 261 Pac. 253 (freshly
filted floors) ; Glenn v. W. T. Grant Co., (1935) 129 Neb. 173, 260 N. W.
811 (same facts) ; Markham v. Bell Stores Co., (1926) 285 Pa. 378, 132
Atl. 178 (vegetable refuse on floor of grocery store). Cf. n. 45, supra.
However, in Bilger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (1934) 316
Pa. 540, 175 Atl. 496. on facts similar to those in Markham V. Bell Stores
Co., supra, the court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. It appears that the management was clearly careless, and
this case must be regarded as an instance where the plaintiff was barred
because of personal fault. Cost v. Fidler, (1915) 119 Ark. 540, 178 S. W.
373 can be explained only on the same basis.
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found it necessary temporarily to encumber the aisles between
counters with boxes used to replenish his stock on display, a cus-
tomer who, in hurriedly retreating on the left-hand side of the
aisle, stumbled and fell was regarded as being guilty of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law.", This kind of juristic manipu-
lation characterizes the disposition of the cases involving transitory
perils.
Extraordinary Conduct by the Business Guest
In most of the cases heretofore considered, the carelessness with
which the plaintiff was charged was his mere inadvertence or in-
difference to his own safety. Despite the broad statement that a
business guest is entitled to assume that the premises are reason-
ably safe and may accordingly relax his vigilance,5 7 no such gen-
eralization is supported by the results reached in the cases. The
extent to which the plaintiff must protect himself varies inversely
with the ability of the defendant to minimize the risk. After the
latter has done all that can reasonably be expected of him, the loss
from such danger as remains must rest where it falls-with the
plaintiff. This simple idea can be described from the defendant's
viewpoint as absence of duty or absence of negligence; from the
plaintiff's viewpoint it can with almost equal ease be termed con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk. The notion that the
plaintiff will be barred from recovery because of his personal fault
is not reflected in the outcome of the litigation in this class of cases.
Situations in which the business guest is guilty of unusual
conduct by reason of which it is claimed that he is contributorily
negligent present only another variation of the same theme. It has
been previously observed that extraordinary conduct by the plain-
tiff can be met only by extraordinary precautions on the part of the
56Williams v. Liberty Stores, Inc., (1921) 148 La. 450. 87 So. 233.
Compare Ginns v. C. T. Sherrer Co., (1914) 219 Mass. 18, 106 N. E.
600 (customer tripped on box in aisle of millinery store; obstruction had
been there for more than half an hour and management had given orders
that boxes should not be left lying around; patron not guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law). Did the difference in the requirements of
the two businesses influence the outcome in these cases?
An interesting problem is raised in the case of Shields v. Van Kelton
Amusement Corp., (1920) 228 N. Y. 396, 127 N. E. 261. The plaintiff was
skating at an open air ice skating rink operated by defendant. As the midday
sun melted the ice in spots, obstructions were arranged so as to exclude
skaters from dangerous areas. All this was observed by plaintiff who con-
tinued within the area where skating was still permitted. She fell when her
skates caught in a soft spot in the ice, and was held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. See also Frye v. Omaha & Council Bluff's
St. Ry., (1921) 106 Neb. 333, 183 N. W. 567.57See note 16, supra.
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defendant.6 Whether or not the latter can be charged with the
special duties thus required is not a question that can be readily
answered. A store cannot be so designed that patrons can with
safety walk backward through the aislesl or meander through the
premises with darkened glasses." In such situations the jury will
likely find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,61
or the court will make a similar finding as a matter of law. 62 On
the other hand, the presence of an attendant may be sufficient to
impose the obligation to warn, in which case the issue of the plain-
tiff's carelessness will be resolved in his favor.63
Some businesses are operated under conditions where unusual
and even boisterous or extravagant conduct is to be expected, and
the management must be prepared to meet the situation. This is
typical of amusement parks, fun houses, swimming pools and sim-
ilar places." Even here, however, there is a point of tolerance
s'Page 68, supra.
z 'Evans v. Orttenburger, (1928) 242 Mich. 57, 217 N. W. 753; Accousi
v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) 87 S. W. 861.
OuDunn v. Kemp & Herbert, (1904) 36 Wash. 183, 78 Pac. 782.
'AAs in Evans v. Orttenburger, (1928) 242 Mich. 57, 217 N. W. 753
and Accousi v. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) 87 S.
W. 861.
2,!As in Dunn v. Kemp & Herbert, (1904) 36 Wash. 183, 78 Pac. 782
6 1J. G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, (1912) 63 Fla. 191, 58 So. 45;
Rosenbaum v. Shoffner, (1897) 98 Tenn. 624, 40 S. W. 1086.
611n the following cases the issue of contributory negligence was held
properly for the jury: Brown v. Rhoades, (1927) 126 Me. 186, 137 AtI.
58 (patron on amusement slide attempted to check his speed with his feet
which wi ere clad in rubber soled shoes, and was precipitated forward) ; Scho-
field v. Wood, (1898) 170 Lass. 415, 49 N. E. 636 (boisterous conduct of
spectators causing collapse of grandstand or fence at sporting event) ; Welsh
v. Jefferson County Agricultural Society, (1931) 121 Neb. 166, 236 N. W.
331 (same facts) ; Steinke v. Palladium Amusement Co., (Mo. App. 1930)
28 S. W. (2d) 440 (injury at skating rink; patrons were permitted to
skate on outside promenade) ; Eldred v. United Amusement Co., (1931) 137
Ore. 452, 2 P. (2d) 1114 (plaintiff riding in "merry mixup" was injured
when attempting to push the car in front of him to add to the excitement) ;
Jackson v. Dreamland Coaster Co., (1926) 4 N. J. Misc. 924, 135 Atl. 56 (in-
jury on defective scenic railway; plaintiff failed to hold on to guard bar) ;
Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., (1935) 289 Mass. 587, 194 N. E.
911 (similar facts; plaintiff was gesticulating and waving) ; Sullivan v.
Detroit & Windsor Ferry Co., (1931) 255 Mich. 575, 238 N. W. 221 (patron
at swimming pool injured by projecting nail on outside of slide while at-
tempting to slide down on his back, head first). With this last case com-
pare Peppler v. Tollettene, (1932) 259 Mich. 35, 242 N. W. 830, when
there was no evidence of negligence, and the contributory negligence issue
was not resorted to.
It is sometimes said that the operator of mechanical amusement de-
vices owes the "highest degree of care" for the patron's safety. (See, for
example, Sand Springs Park v. Shrader, (1921) 82 Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983.)
Such statements contribute little to the solution of the problems in these
cases, and must be regarded as window dressing in the opinion.
An excellent illustration of the fact that even extreme carelessness by
plaintiff may be ignored where defendant is clearly negligent is afforded by
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which cannot be exceeded. The public expects for a moderate fee
to buy excitement and the illusion of danger. If the defendant is
to supply merchantable realistic thrills at reasonable prices, he is
entitled to expect that the patron will make some adjustment to
his situation.6" It follows that the obligation of the management
is not to be defined solely in terms of foreseeable conduct, but like-
wise with reference to the economic possibility of reducing the
risk. Important considerations in these cases are the type of cli-
entele to which the establishment caters and the feasibility of sup-
plementing unavoidable shortcomings in design or construction
with personal supervision.66 The so-called "fun house" represents
an extreme illustration of this type of case. The patrons of these
places pay their fare in order to expose themselves deliberately to
hilarious and dangerous situations. It is difficult for the manage-
ment to give them what they want and at the same time to guar-
antee their safety.6 Consequently, the courts tend to apply liber-
the case of Rienzi v. Tilyou, (1929) 252 N. Y. 97, 169 N. E. 101. The
plaintiffs, husband and wife and weighing 440 pounds in the aggregate, at-
tempted to ride on a single mechanical racehorse. They were injured in a
fall which resulted from a defective stirrup strap, and the issue of con-
tributory negligence was held for the jury's consideration.65In the following cases the plaintiff was held guilty of contributory
negligence: Rayfield v. Sans Souci Park, 147 Ill. App. 493 (1909)
(children playing tag in mirror maze which was intended for use as
a puzzle and was not constructed for playground purposes; plaintiff ran
into a mirror, which broke) ; Bernier v. Woodstock Agricultural Sockty,
(1914) 88 Conn. 558, 92 Atl. 160 (boy witnessing balloon ascension grabbed
a rope on balloon to get "a little ride up" and was dropped from three
hundred feet in the air); State, to use of Hamel v. Glen Echo Park Co.,
(1921) 137 Md. 529, 113 AtI. 85 (deceased stood up in car of scenic rail-
way with obvious result) ; Mikulski v. Morgan, (1934) 268 Mich. 314, 256
N. W. 339 (misuse of ducking apparatus at swimming pool).66Arndt v. Riverview Park Co., 259 Ill. App. 210 (1930) (child at-
tempted to ride on merry-go-round with fifty pound brother in her lap and
fell when she released her grip to wave at her mother; verdict for plaintiff
affirmed) ; Brown v. Columbia Amustement Co., (1932) 91 Mont. 174,
6 P. (2d) 874 (mother injured in attempting to leap onto moving merry-
go-round to rescue child from danger; device was improperly attended;
same result) ; Ainsworth v. Murphy, (Orl. App. 1926) 5 La. App. 103
(ten year old child attempted to change horses on moving merry-go-round;
held barred by contributroy negligence. Note the impracticability of defend-
ant's guarding against this type of occurrence). With this case compare
Harris v. Crawley, (1912) 170 Mich. 381, 136 N. W. 356 (child jumped
off moving merry-go-round).
. 67"It was for the thrill of bumping and of the escape from being bumped
that plaintiff entered the contrivance and remained there after opportunity
for exit had occurred. The chance of collision was that which gave zest to
the game upon which plaintiff had entered." Case, J., in Gardner v. G.
Howard Mitchell, Inc., (1931) 107 N. J. Law 311, 314, 153 AtI. 607, 609.
"The antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric.
The rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own
guffaws, but they are not the pleasures of tranquility. The plaintiff was not
seeking a retreat for meditation." Cardozo, J., in Murphy v. Steeplechase
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ally the doctrine of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
whenever they find that further efforts by the management to
minimize the peril would be impossible or impracticable. 8
Concerning the Traffic Cases
Some readers will doubtless feel that the foregoing observa-
tions, while correctly reflecting the attitude of courts and juries
toward contributory negligence in the landowner cases, have little
application to injuries which flow from the operation of trains and
motor vehicles. It can be properly pointed out that the doctrine of
contributory negligence is largely a product of the transportation
cases and that these represent the instances of its most frequent
use. Certain points of difference between the transportation cases
and the landowner cases have already been noted ;"8 others deserve
brief mention here.
The type of misconduct most frequently charged against the
business guest is mere passivity-a failure affirmatively to watch
out for himself. This differs only in degree from assumed risk;
and the close relationship between an assumption of risk and the
absence of a duty to use due care has been observed many times3°
This observation, however, is something quite different from what
the writer has attempted to point out in the preceding pages. It
is one thing to state that where the plaintiff has manifested a
willingness to take on a recognized danger this extinguishes any
duty to use care which otherwise might exist. Such a position
Amusement Co., (1929) 250 N. Y. 479, 483, 166 N. E. 173, 174. In this
case the plaintiff was' injured on a device known as a "flopper," consisting
of a moving inclined belt with irregular sporadic motion which caused her
to fall. A verdict for plaintiff was reversed on appeal.
'.-Sullivan v. Ridgeway Constr. Co., (1920) 236 Mass. 75, 127 N. E.
543 (plaintiff who jumped from belt conveyor at foot of slide assumed the
risk) ; Nicoletti v. Park Circuit & Realty Co., (Mo. App. 1926) 287 S. W.
6t( (corpulent plaintiff lost her balance on slide because she disobeyed
instructions to lean forward; the court was not impressed by her insistence
that the accident was occasioned because an attendant gave her "da beeg-a
pooh"). Recovery was allowed in Dahna v. Fun House Co., (1927) 204
Iowa 922, 216 N. W. 262. Here plaintiff was injured by a concealed mech-
anism which suddenly raised the floor level. In view of the fact that the
public asks for such surprises the problem of liability was very difficult.
Compare Carlin v. Krout, (1923) 142 M.d. 140, 120 Att. 232 (plaintiff's
arm caught in handrail on "ocean wave"; case disposed of favorably to de-
fendant without mention of contributory negligence or assumption of risk).
""Page 71, supra.
,"Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence (1895)
8 Harv. L. Rev. 457. Professor Bohlen has said: "In a word, voluntary as-
sumpticon of risk merely negatives the duty to take care to provide safe
conditions and to prevent the failure to do so from being actionable negli-
gence." Bohlen, supra note 4, at 247. The same point of view has been set
forth in Prosser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 377, Sec. 51.
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presupposes an otherwise existing duty which, if breached, would
give rise to a valid cause of action, provided only that the plaintiff
had not "sold out" by assuming the risk. The assumption by the
plaintiff, under this view, still remains affirmative conduct, or is
at least a manifestation of attitude, which transfers the risk from
the shoulders of the defendant and bars the possibility of recovery,
irrespective of all else. It is quite another thing to point out, as
the writer has attempted to do, that both assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are mere phrases of supererogation used by
the courts to explain an absence of either duty or negligence on the
part of the defendant. In other words, in such situations the case
against the defendant is not meritorious because the exactions
claimed of him are more than he can be required to meet. If this
is correct and the terms assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence are devices of legal forensics, they are as adaptable for use
in one type of negligence case as in another.
Furthermore, the group of cases considered in the last preced-
ing section involved active participation by the plaintiff in the
creation of the risk, and these situations do not materially differ
from the transportation cases. Indeed, in all such instances the
plaintiff's active participation must be regarded as an added cir-
cumstance calling for leniency in the attitude toward the defend-
ant, and thus an even stronger case for the use of some mediating
device is presented than in the situations where the plaintiff's con-
duct is merely passive indifference.
It is submitted that in the traffic cases there is more occasion
for resort to contributory negligence for the purpose heretofore
suggested than in any other class of litigation. In the first place,
the issue of the defendant's negligence is likely to be determined
on an entirely arbitrary basis. The violation of traffic statutes and
ordinances is generally regarded as wholly conclusive on the
negligence issue. Consequently all efforts to individualize the situ-
ation must operate through indirection.," As a result the proxi-
mate cause issue is overburdened and the question of whether the
plaintiff's negligence was a contributing factor is pressed to the
breaking point.7-2 Second, the traffic cases, like other situations
involving transitory peril, must often be solved in terms of adver-
tence and reaction by the defendant. These human characteristics
71See the interesting collection of cases in Shulman and James, Cases
and Materials on the Law of Torts (1942) 638 et seq.
72See generally on this subject, Green, Contributory Negligence and
Proximate Cause (1927) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 3.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
are almost impossible to evaluate with any assurance in a given
situation, and the need for flexibility in disposing of these cases
is prominent.
If the conduct of the plaintiff has magnified the hazard which
the defendant must meet to such an extent that it becomes im-
politic to cast the burden on his shoulders, what could be more
expectable than a resort to contributory negligence as a bar to
recovery? An ample variety of mediating devices thereby becomes
available to the court,7a including that artful phrase, the last clear
chance;7' and there is the further comfort of knowing that an
escape is available when desired through the relegation of the
contributory negligence issue to the jury with fair assurance as
to the outcome. At least it seems proper to suggest that contribu-
tory negligence as employed in the traffic cases deserves a fair
re-examination in terms of what is being done with the doctrine,
rather than what is being said about it by the courts.
- These include the rule that contributory negligence is not a defense
against the wilful negligence of the defendant, as well as the possibility that
the plaintiff's negligence did not materially contribute to the accident or
that it was not a "proximate cause" thereof.
7;Compare James, supra note 8, at 704.
